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NOTES
PAROLE REVOCATION AND
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

In the American criminal justice system, there are two procedures
under which a convicted criminal is permitted to serve all or part of
his or her sentence outside the confines of prison. These procedures
are probation and parole.' Probation may be defined as a disposition
of a case following conviction whereby sentence is suspended for a
specific period of time, and imprisonment avoided. Conditions of
probation which limit the freedom of the offender are imposed to
control and assist in the rehabilitation of the prisoner.2 Parole is the
release of a prisoner from a penal institution prior to the expiration
of his or her sentence. The prisoner is given supervision and guidance
by a parole officer and agrees to follow a series of release condi3
tions.
The two procedures are similar because they both allow conditional liberty which can be revoked for noncompliance with the
imposed conditions or the commission of a new substantive offense.4
The similarities notwithstanding, probation and parole have clear-cut
differences. Probation is characteristically a judicial process initiated
by suspending imposition of a sentence, or by imposing a sentence
and then suspending its execution.' All conditions of probation,
their modification, and the initiation of revocation proceedings for
their violation are instituted by the court.6 Similarly, the probation
officer who supervises the prisoner acts directly for the court. 7 In
contrast, parole is an administrative process. All decisions concerning
conditions and duration of parole, manner of supervision, and initiation of revocation proceedings are made by a state or federal parole
board, which is a part of the correctional, not the judicial system.'
Traditionally, both the parolee and the probationer were viewed as
1. P. Tappan, Crime, Justice and Correction 539, 709 (1960).
2. Id. at 539; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-17-14(A) (2d Repl. 1972).
3. Tappan, supra note 1, at 709; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-17-14(B) (2d Repl. 1972).
4. Fisher, Parole and Probation Revocation Procedures after Morrisey and Gagnon, 65
J Crim. L. & Criminology 46 (1974).
5. Id. at 46.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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having virtually no due process rights. 9 A variety of theories were
followed by courts and parole boards to explain this phenomenon.
Three of the most prominent theories were: (1) the grace theory, (2)
the contract theory, and (3) the custody theory.' 0 Under the grace
theory, probation and parole were defined as privileges or acts of
mercy by the court or parole board, and not rights. Since parole and
probation were gifts, they could be taken away without giving the
prisoner notice of the reason for revocation or an opportunity to
present a defense. 1 1 Under the contract theory, the conditions of
release were viewed as terms in a contract, which the prisoner was
theoretically free to accept or reject. Rejection most certainly meant
a denial of parole or probation, however. Release on parole or probation indicated that the prisoner had accepted the terms, and was
consequently estopped from complaining when the conditional
liberty was taken away."2 And the breach of any condition was
equivalent to a breach of the contract of release. Under the custody
theory, the parolee and probationer were viewed as constantly under
the custody of the parole board or court, even while at liberty in the
community. The prisoner was not considered free, but rather one
who had lost the right to expect the due process rights of a free
person. Thus, when parole or probation was revoked, the court or
parole board was merely substituting one type of custody for an1
other. 3
In recent years, these traditional views have begun to change, and
a series of cases has begun to give parolees and probationers due
process rights, particularly by granting them the right to notice of
alleged parole and probation violations' 4 and the right to a hearing
prior to actual revocation.1 I Additionally, there have begun to
develop certain conditions under which probationers and parolees are
entitled to counsel.1 6 Initially, because probation was considered a
part of the criminal prosecution process, 1 7 courts were willing to find
a right to counsel at probation revocation hearings,1 8 while they
9. Note, Due Process, Equal Protection and the New Mexico Parole System, 2 N.M. L.
Rev. 234, 240 (1972).
10. Fisher, supra note 4, at 47-48.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
15. Id. at 495, 498.
16. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967);Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
17. Mempav. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
18. Id., Blea v. Cox, 75 N.M. 265, 403 P.2d 701 (1965). Mempa and Blea limited the
right to counsel at probation revocation hearings to those hearings which could be con-

May 1975]

PAROLE REVOCA TION HEARINGS

refused to do so for parole revocation hearings' 9 on the grounds that
parole was not part of a criminal prosecution and was thereby not
subject to the sixth amendment protections. At present, however,
there is growing authority for the proposition that under certain
circumstances parolees, too, are entitled to counsel at revocation
20
hearings.
Some states continue, nevertheless, to follow the traditional
doctrines which deprive parolees of the right to counsel at revocation
hearings. New Mexico is one such state. The New Mexico Legislature
and the New Mexico Supreme Court have declared that parolees have
no right to counsel, either appointed or retained. 2 ' This comment
will show the questionable constitutionality of such a position in
view of the United States Supreme Court decision in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli2 2 and other decisions, and encourage the New Mexico
Legislature to reform its laws to allow at least a case-by-case determination of the right to counsel2 at parole revocation hearings, if
not an absolute right to counsel at such hearings. 2 4
Section 41-17-27 of the New Mexico Statutes Annotated provides:
"The [parole] board shall not be required to hear oral statements or
arguments by attorneys or other persons not connected with [sic]
correctional system."' '
In- -Robinson v. Cox 2 6 the New Mexico
Supreme Court interpreted this section of the statute and explained
its position concerning the right to counsel at parole revocation
hearings. The Court considered whether there was a constitutional
right to counsel at parole revocation hearings, and if not, whether
New Mexico law required appointment of counsel or allowed
parolees facing revocation of parole to employ counsel at their own
expense. Those questions were answered negatively. 2 In reaching
this decision, the Court held that due process did not require
parolees to have appointed or retained counsel 2 ' and concluded that
if there was any right to counsel it would have to be found in
sidered a part of the criminal prosecution process, where the imposition of a sentence has
been held in abeyance for a period during which the prisoner is on probation.
19. Robinson v. Cox, 77 N.M. 55, 419 P.2d 253 (1966).
20. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Fisher, supra note 4, at 46.
21. Robinson v. Cox, 77 N.M. 55, 57-58, 419 P.2d 253, 255-257 (1966); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 41-17-27 (2d Repl. 1972).
22. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
23. Id.
24. See note 63 infra.
25. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-17-27 (2d Repl. 1972). This section applies to hearings on both
parole applications and parole revocations. Note, supra note 9, at 236.
26. 77 N.M. 58, 419 P.2d 253 (1966).
27. Id. at 57, 419 P.2d at 256.
28. Id. at 57-58, 419 P.2d at 256-257.

NEWMEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

legislative fiat. 2 Addressing its attention to section 41-17-27, the
Court held that it was "clear that the legislature not only did not
intend to require the appointment of counsel to represent an
indigent parolee, but to the contrary, expressly provided3 that the
Blea v.
board need not permit any counsel to appear before it."
Cox,' ' a case holding that an indigent was guaranteed the right to
counsel by the federal and New Mexico constitutions at a hearing to
revoke a suspended sentence, was distinguished on the facts. In so
doing, the Court relied heavily on the distinction between a hearing
to revoke parole and a hearing to revoke a suspended sentence,
saying:
A release on parole is an act of clemency or grace resting entirely
within the discretion of the parole board. One who is paroled is not
thereby released from custody, but is merely permitted to serve a
portion of his sentence outside the walls of the penitentiary. . . . A
paroled prisoner is not discharged from the custody of the prison
authorities, but is at all times under the complete custody and
control ... of the parole board ... whereas in the case of a suspen-

of the
sion of sentence, the person has never commenced service
32
sentence and has, therefore, the right to personal liberty.
Robinson seems, therefore, to adopt two traditional propositions of
correctional law: While free from prison, a parolee remains in
custody and has no judicially cognizable claim to continued liberty.
In this view revocation of parole and return to prison is merely the
substitution of one form of custody for another. Secondly, differences in the natures of parole and probation are sufficient to justify a
right to counsel at hearings to revoke a suspended sentence, but not
at hearings to revoke parole. It is submitted, however, that neither of
these propositions is currently adequate to support denial of access
to counsel at parole revocation hearings.
In Morrisey v. Brewer3 3 the United States Supreme Court considered at length the nature of parole and the rights of parolees. It
held that parolees were entitled to certain minimum due process
rights and outlined what those rights were with regard to parole
revocation. In reaching this decision, the Court explicitly addressed
and rejected the argument that a parolee was not really at liberty
while under parole, but rather was still in custody, his or her freedom
being a matter of grace, not of right. The Supreme Court in Morrisey
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 57, 419 P.2d at 255.
Id. at 58, 419 P.2d at 255.
75 N.M. 265, 403 P.2d 701 (1965).
77 N.M. at 59, 419 P.2d at 256.
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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reaffirmed its position in Graham v. Richardson3" that "this court
now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon
whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a
'privilege,' " and concluded that
the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of
the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a

"grievous loss" on the parolee and often on others. It is hardly
useful any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms of
whether the parolee's liberty is a "right" or a "privilege." By whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must
be seen as within the
3
protection of the fourteenth amendment.

Similarly, many cases and articles have firmly denounced the argument that the differences between the purpose and administration of
probation as opposed to those of parole are sufficiently great to
justify having a right to counsel at probation revocation hearings but
not at parole revocations.3 6 As one commentator has stated,
These technical differences should not receive constitutional
importance. Procedural protections cannot be denied to parolees

solely because different labels are used to describe what is done to
them when they are forced to return to prison and because different
bodies administer the revocation. The similarities between parole
and probation revocations are much more impressive than their
3
differences.

7

The Supreme Court, addressing the same point in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli 3 concluded that the "petitioner does not contend that
there is any difference relevant to the guarantee of due process
between the revocation of parole and the revocation of probation,
3
nor do we perceive one."1 9
The foregoing discussion shows that the two major arguments
relied on in the Robinson case to hold that parolees have no right to
counsel are without substantial support. However, the mere negation
of these two arguments does not lead inexorably to the conclusion
that parolees do have a right to counsel at revocation hearings. It is
34. 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
35. 408 U.S. at 483.
36. See People ex reL Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 380, 267 N.E.2d 238, 241,
318 N.Y.S.2d 449, 453-54 (1971); People v. Vickers, 8 Cal.3d 451, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305,
310-311, 503 P.2d 1313, 1321, (1973); Dyke, ParoleRevocation Hearings inCalifornia: the
Right to Counsel, 59 Cal. L. Rev. 1215, 1241, (1971); Burkholder, Due Process Rights in
Parole and Probation Revocations: Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), 6 Conn. L.
Rev. 559; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
37. Dyke, supra note 36, at 1241.
38. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).

39. Id. at 782.
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clear, however, from a reading of the decision in Gagnon that an
absolute rule that parolees are not entitled to appointed or retained
counsel for revocation hearings is unconstitutional.
The Court in Gagnon discussed the issue of a parolee's right to
counsel at revocation hearings. While they declined to find an
4
absolute right to counsel in all hearings, 0 they did hold that in
some cases a parolee would have a right to counsel at such proceedings. 4 1 The majority admitted that in most cases counsel would
4
be "both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary." 2 But in
some cases where the revocation hearing would require the resolution of different versions of a disputed set of facts, the consideration
of complex documentary evidence, cross-examination of
witnesses,4 3 or the presentation of substantial reasons for mitigation
of an admitted parole violation,4 4 a parolee could not be expected
to fairly present his or her arguments without assistance of counsel.4 s The Court adopted a case-by-case approach to the right to
counsel,4 6 and the state authority charged with the responsibility
for administering parole was empowered to determine the need for
counsel. 4 7

The Gagnon decision makes it clear that section 41-17-27 as it
now stands confers upon the parole board an unconstitutionally
broad discretion. The statute grants the parole board the power to
refuse to permit counsel to appear before it. This power would
include cases where under the Gagnon standard the parolee would
have a right to counsel. 4 8 Thus, at the very minimum, section
41-17-27 should be changed to reflect the holding in Gagnon to
allow a case-by-case determination of the need to counsel at parole
revocation hearings, and in those instances where the state parole
hearing board determines that there is a need for counsel, the board
should be required to hear them. This change would help to notify
attorneys and prisoners who might be unaware of the holding in
Gagnon, and further, the Legislature would be supporting strict com40. Id. at 787.
41. Id. at 788.
42. Id. at 790.
43. Id. at 786.
44. Id. at 787.
45. Id. at 788.
46. Id. at 790.
47. Id.
48. It is true that section 41-17-27 does not categorically prohibit appearance of counsel
at revocation hearings. It allows the parole board to use their discretion as to when to allow
or refuse to allow representation by counsel. However, the statute, as interpreted in Robinson v. Cox, gives the parole board so much discretionary power, that the potential for abuse
is great.
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pliance with the Supreme Court decision. However, Gagnon suggests
only the bare minimum of what should be done with regard to
parolees' rights to counsel. Before instituting any change, the arguments in favor of an absolute right to counsel4 9 at parole revocation
hearings should be examined. To understand these arguments it is
first necessary to return to Gagnon.
As mentioned above, the Court in Gagnon declined to hold that
there was an absolute right to counsel at parole revocation hearings.
The Court feared that such a right to counsel would "impose direct
costs and serious collateral disadvantages"' 0 and would lead to the
state demanding its own counsel, an escalation which would destroy
the informal nature of the revocation hearing, long considered
vital.' 1 The majority believed that a constitutional right to counsel
at revocation hearings would mean that the parole board's "decisionmaking process will be prolonged, and the financial cost to the
State-for appointed counsel, counsel for the State, a longer record,
and the possibility of judicial review-will not be insubstantial."" 2
Despite the fears of the Gagnon court there are strong arguments in
favor of having a right to counsel at all revocation hearings. In several
states where there is a right to counsel at revocation hearings,
commentators and judges have failed to observe the adverse effects
predicted in Gagnon, and indeed have been critical of the case-bycase approach adopted therein."
In a recent case before the Second Circuit, the Court of Appeals
criticized the State of Connecticut's arguments that the presence of
counsel would be deleterious to the parole process, saying:
[T] he state has demonstrated no respect in which the presence of
counsel for the limited purpose of developing and evaluating relevant
events of a parolee's history on parole, and of recommending alternative dispositions to revocation, will tend to inhibit or constrict the
parole process. Indeed, representation of parolees at revocation
hearings should advance, not retard the "modern concept of individualized punishment" and rehabilitation.5 4
Similarly, in People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Green Haven State
49. See Note 63 infra, and accompanying text.

50. 411 U.S. at 787.
51. Id. at 788.
52. Id.
53. People ex reL Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1971); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969), United States ex rel.
Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 404 U.S.

879 (1971).

54. U.S. ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 879 (1971).
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Prison,5 1 the New York Court of Appeals in holding that parolees
had an absolute constitutional right to counsel at revocation hearings, failed to find any evidence to indicate that a right to counsel
would have an adverse effect on the parole system."6 An absolute
right to counsel is not dangerous to the informal operation of parole
boards because the role of counsel at the hearing is to be very limited. As the Menechino court stated, "participation by counsel need
be no greater than is required to assure, to the board as well as to the
parolee, that the board is accurately informed of the fact before it
acts. ...

"I

This concept was developed at length in United States

ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Board of Parole," 8 where the court
stressed that the parole board conducting the revocation hearing has,
and should exercise, the power to prevent parolee's counsel from
turning the informal hearing into a courtroom battle, saying:
To the extent that a lawyer who misconceives his role in the parole
process might resort to dilatory or distracting tactics, or equate it

with his role in the trial of a case, the board does not lack the power
to so structure the proceedings as to maximize the lawyers contribution and minimize his potential for disruption....

We stress once again that the participation of the lawyer at a
parole hearing should be limited to investigating and explicating to

the board, evidence bearing on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of
events during the parplee's period of release and their significance,

provided these are relevant to the disposition of the prisoner's
case.... We emphatically stress that our decision does not detract in
the least from the Board's power to limit counsel's participation in

revocation hearings so that parole hearings do not become legal
battles. Counsel's proper role is to assist the Board, not to impede it,
and the Board may take appropriate measures to assure that the
counsel appreciates his limited role and presents his client's case

accordingly.5 9

So long as the parole board, the parolee, and counsel are aware of the
limited purpose and role of counsel at the hearing, and so long as the
parole board appreciates its power to control the conduct of the
hearing, the prediction of unmanageable time delays, the transformation of the revocation hearing into an adversary proceeding, and the
need for the state to be represented by counsel, all articulated in
Gagnon, are exaggerated.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
Id. at 385, 267 N.E.2d at 243, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
Id. at 383, 267 N.E.2d at 242, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 879 (1971).
Id. at 1088-1089.
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Further, the case-by-case approach proposed in Gagnon itself has
been subject to attack. In Hewett v. State of North Carolina6" the
court rejected such an ad hoc approach, because the "articulation of
where the line should be drawn between those who should have been
supplied with counsel and those who may be denied counsel, would
be difficult, if not impossible."'" But a problem even more important than the administrative difficulties of such a system is that
"[elven the most superficially frivolous proceedings may
reveal to
competent counsel procedural or substantive irregularities which
require correction in order to safeguard the interests of a probationer." 6

2

The resolution of the debate over the merits of a case-by-case
determination of the need for counsel at parole revocation hearings,
as opposed to an absolute right, need not be attempted in a vacuum.

At least nine states and the District of Columbia provide for a right
to counsel at parole revocation hearings either by statute or through
case law, offering models for the New Mexico Legislature to examine
in addressing the problem. 3
This discussion has been designed to show the constitutional
inadequacy of section 41-17-27. Clearly, the Gagnon decision alone
warrants a change to the case-by-case determination of the right to
counsel at parole revocation hearings. However, in revising section
41-17-27, the New Mexico Legislature has an opportunity to do
more than adopt the bare minimum which the United States
Supreme Court has mandated. The experience of several states has
shown the efficacy of an absolute right to counsel at parole revocation hearings. It is strongly urged that the New Mexico Legislature
recognize the need to change section 41-17-27, by adopting an
absolute right to counsel at parole revocation hearings.
PAUL W. GRIMM

60. 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969).
61. Id. at 1324-1325; See Fisher, supra note 4, at 54.
62. Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316, 1325 (4th Cir. 1969).
63. People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1971); Warden v. Palumbo, 214 Md. 407, 135 A.2d 439 (1957); Commonwealth
v.
Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969); People v. Vickers, 8 Cal.3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313,
105 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1973) (dictum); State v. Boggs, 49 Del. 277, 114 A.2d 663 (1955); Ala.
Code tit. 42, § 12 (1958); D.C. Code Ann. § 24-206 (1973); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 947.23(1)
(Supp. 1974); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 7 9 1.2 4 0(a) (Supp. 1975); Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann.
§ 94-9835 (1947). See Annot., 36 L.E.2d 1077, 1117 (1974). A recent attempt at reform
of parole laws was S. 3993, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4207 (1972).

